Even without context, we can read this code and immediately grasp what data we should expect to be fed into these functi

The value of a physical retail infrastructure has been clear since Amazon made their largest acquisition ever, Whole Foods (* see addendum below for more on this). Brick and mortar stores have tremendous online value in addition to enabling true omnichannel commerce. Nothing matters more for an e-commerce company than marketing efficiency expressed either as gross margin $ payback period or the ratio of CAC to LTV. Brick and mortar stores significantly lower online CAC by improving marketing efficiency (higher click through rates, higher quality scores for ads). Consumers are more likely to trust a brand they have seen in the real world. Ironic in a world where “CAC is the new rent” that one of the best ways to lower your online rent, i.e. CAC, is to pay rent offline for physical stores. Brick and mortar stores also enable BOPIS (buy online pickup in store) and the in-store return of items purchased online, which consumers value. Economically, BOPIS will always be cheaper than same day delivery and large numbers of consumers are highly cost sensitive.

Amazon actually did periodic “check-ins,” to ensure that their investments were actually profitable — i.e. they were always a super financially disciplined organization driven by FCF and ROIC, but Bezos liked to “check-in” every so often to make sure that their investments were rational investments with a high ROIC that drove FCF. They did these check-ins regularly, most notably in 2004 and 2009, and showed that they could generate significant FCF margins while still growing rapidly. Yet long after these “check-ins,” retail executives continued to believe Amazon was unprofitable. I vividly remember a well regarded retail CEO explaining in 2012 that e-commerce was unprofitable based on Amazon’s headline profitability numbers. At that point, it should have been obvious to even casual observers that Amazon’s US e-commerce business was consistently running between mid single digit to low double digit EBIT margins and funding their international expansion.

Three dictionary methods dict.keys(), dict.values(), and dict.items() all return a different view of a dictionary. Now, a mapping attribute has been added to each of these view objects.

Rather than blindly truncating mismatched data, the new strict argument allows us to control the behavior of zip — something that will save plenty of developers from a headache somewhere down the line.

Three dictionary methods dict.keys(), dict.values(), and dict.items() all return a different view of a dictionary. Now, a mapping attribute has been added to each of these view objects.

These changes show a commitment to the type annotation features of Python. The added clarity to our favorite libraries (and our own code) may leave an interesting long-term impact on the Python ecosystem.

In complex code bases (and even simple ones), type annotation can massively improve readability. Simultaneously, not everyone will want (or need) to use them — so an optional, exception-free functionality strikes a perfect balance.

The first of those comes with PEP 618, which adds an optional strict flag to the zip() function. If we set strict=True an error will be raised if both inputs to zip are not of an equal length.

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tional company wants the maximum profit possible. This is their only goal but you aren’t a textbook model. You don’t have to maximize your profit at the cost of everything else in your life. Other things give us joy and can’t be measured so coldly.

It was not until Wal-Mart bought Jet.com in 2016 that retail executives began to broadly wake up and embrace e-commerce. Marc Lore was the CEO and founder of Jet.com and an excellent e-commerce executive who had founded diapers.com and soap.com (urban legend is that he and Tony Hsieh both sold to Amazon because of Sequoia’s RIP Good Times memo from 2008). Marc Lore told everyone who would listen that Amazon was consistently running 8 to 10% FCF margins in North American retail, that no one was competing with them and that there was an opportunity to build a large, profitable competitor in America. I was a board observer for Jet.com and believe acquiring it was profoundly important for Walmart and woke up many other retailers to the importance of aggressively investing in e-commerce.

The future was always going to be omnichannel. Pundits have been prematurely predicting this for many years, but it is finally happening. There is a strange belief in certain circles that the future will be e-commerce only and that brick and mortar stores have no value. This is strange because the worlds largest, most sophisticated e-commerce companies are all opening stores. Lots of stores. Amazon opened dozens of “Amazon Go” stores in 2019 and is reportedly planning on opening up to 3000 of these stores by 2021 in the United States alone. Amazon already has multiple store formats in the United States: Go, Whole Foods, Book Stores and others. In his 2017 letter to shareholders, Jack Ma wrote that “Commerce as we know it is changing in front of our eyes. ‘E-commerce’ is rapidly evolving into ‘New Retail.’ The boundary between offline and online commerce disappears as we focus on fulfilling the personalized needs of each customer.” Alibaba is rapidly opening several different store formats throughout China. JD is also rapidly opening stores. Wayfair has stores. Led by Warby Parker, most DTC branded startups have stores.

Said another way, long term steady state FCF will likely be the at the same level for many e-commerce, videogame and streaming media companies as it would have been before Covid. This is not to say that Covid did not increase their value; it did but primarily by pulling their financials forward a few years which obviously matters in a DCF. Whereas long term steady state FCF will likely be significantly higher for category leading brick and mortar retailers who had reasonably strong e-commerce businesses coming into Covid. Especially so for those category leading retailers who operate in inflationary categories where inventory turns are less important than they are in deflationary categories where e-commerce only companies have structural cost advantages due to faster inventory turns.

Despite all of these advantages conferred by owning a physical retail infrastructure, most brick and mortar retailers were painfully slow to embrace e-commerce and omnichannel. An entire generation of management teams effectively ceded the future to Amazon because of objectively incorrect beliefs about e-commerce profitability and internal cultural issues. In some ways, the bursting of the bubble in 2000 was the best thing that ever happened to Amazon. The bursting of the bubble, the collapse in Amazon’s stock price and the aggressive way Amazon ran their business convinced most retail executives that e-commerce was unprofitable. In reality, Amazon’s US e-commerce business likely became significantly profitable more than 15 years ago, but they invested aggressively in new categories and new geographies which masked this fact for people doing superficial analysis.

Beyond an erroneous belief that e-commerce was unprofitable which kept them from investing in e-commerce, brick and mortar retailers struggled online for cultural reasons. The most important functions at a brick and mortar retailer were generally real estate and merchandising. i.e. Getting the right store locations at the right cost and then filling those stores with the right products at the right prices. Unfortunately, both of those functions were largely irrelevant online — a URL was your store and you had endless shelf space. Data and analytics mattered much more online than having a great team of human merchants. There was a great story in the “Everything Store” about how the algorithms outperformed the human editors that Amazon employed in their book section. A culture of relentless A/B testing and data driven decision making was essential to online success.

I believe the biggest long term beneficiaries of Covid will prove to be category leading brick and mortar retailers. By this I simply mean brick and mortar retailers who have dominant share in a category — whether it be home improvement, general merchandise, electronics or any other retail category. Their destiny has likely changed forever. Many of the perceived Covid winners such as e-commerce, videogame and streaming media companies have simply been pulled a few years forward into a future that was in