The idea for a scientific advisor to the president arose in the immediate aftermath of World War II. As the radiant glow

The “job” in question was less science-driven and more defense-driven, in spite of the role’s title. “One immediate concern was to get the country in a position to fight a war in the next three to four years,” Hornig said, again in 1968. This highlights a fundamental issue with the science advisor, at least for its first few decades: the president seemed to see this advisor as extremely tightly tied to military matters, rather than just a general scientific expert off of which to bounce policy ideas.

The OSTP’s actual offices sit next door to the White House, in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. If you look closely, you can see that the tiled floors actually contain outlines of fossilized creatures, scattered haphazardly around the hallways. Holdren met me in his outer office, eager to completely avoid discussing the President-Elect and just as eager to discuss some of the history of the science advisor position, a favorite topic of his. We sat at a conference table in a larger inner office, a room that looked about as one would imagine a lifelong nerd’s to look: NASA models sat atop a bookshelf, and piles of folders and papers lined most surfaces. It was December, and the afternoon light through the windows faded quickly after we sat down.

In the early days of the science advisor — in particular beginning with the Eisenhower administration when the first full-time advisor, James Killian, took office in 1957 — the men who held the position apparently enjoyed easy access to the Oval Office and held the president’s ear on a variety of issues.

In Golden’s memorandum explaining the recommendation, he noted that “more than ten” independent government departments and agencies were conducting scientific research, at a cost of $1.3 billion (nearly $13 billion in 2016 dollars). Those agencies all reported separately to the president, so Golden wrote that “[t]here is need for centralization of knowledge of all these scientific programs in one independent and technically competent individual to whom the President can turn for advice.”

It was at the tail end of his time in that office, as the most anti-science president in U.S. history prepared to take over from arguably the most pro-science president, that I visited Holdren to talk about his tenure and the history of his position.

Before 1957, the science advisor and an associated committee was attached to the Office of Defense Mobilization, essentially a major step removed from the White House. After Sputnik’s launch, though, it was moved officially under the White House umbrella. “It had been essentially a long-range, somewhat philosophical planning body, removed one notch from the President,” said Donald F. Hornig, who held the post in the latter part of Lyndon Johnson’s administration, in 1968. After 1957, it transformed from “a remote advisory committee to a group with a job to be done.”

Among Golden’s confidantes while thinking through and preparing that original recommendation was Vannevar Bush himself. Bush complained to Golden that, contrary to his role under Roosevelt, he found himself on the outside looking in when it came to the government’s treatment of science. He apparently found Truman’s lack of interest in his own advice more than a bit frustrating, and told Golden that though a science advisor might sound good, the role’s efficacy would depend entirely on the specific president he was advising — in Truman’s case, his stubbornness would mean he simply wouldn’t make use of the advisor’s expertise.

“The most important thing is that there be a relationship of trust between the president and the science advisor,” he told me, “so that when the science advisor has something to say that the president doesn’t want to hear, the president doesn’t assume that it’s wrong, doesn’t assume that the science advisor made it up to make his life more difficult.”

In those early days, Golden’s idea was to have the advisor be a part-time position, and that whomever inhabited the role “be actively engaged in some other fulltime pursuit so that he would naturally be currently posted on goings on in the scientific world and in fact, be a part of them.” President Truman did appoint an advisor in 1951, Bell Labs president Oliver Buckley, and that part-time status held until 1957, when the Soviet launch of Sputnik sent American science into overdrive and sent the advisor into a full-time White House office.

This is a repeated refrain from former advisors and observers of the position: that there must be a good, established relationship between the science advisor and advisee in order for the relationship to function. This makes sense, though it can feel somewhat disappointing — if the science being advocated is good and true, who cares who the messenger is? But we’ve seen that ideal, of course, get shot down time and again already when it comes to science and government.

In it, Bush argued for increased funding for basic research, an increase in military-based research even during peacetime, and made recommendations that would eventually lead to the founding of the National Science Foundation in 1950. He also suggested that “a permanent Science Advisory Board should be created to advise the executive and legislative branches of Government on these matters.”

The idea of a board or of a single advisor was thrown around for a few years, until William Golden, an investment banker who had served in Washington with the Navy during the war, was tapped as a consultant to President Truman in late 1950. Golden had helped organize the Atomic Energy Commission, and was familiar with many civilian and military scientists around the country. He spent months talking to those prominent experts before sending Truman a recommendation in December 1950 to appoint “an outstanding scientific leader as Scientific Adviser to the President.”

If you created a mold that would somehow generate a human with all the best possible qualities of a presidential science advisor, John Holdren is what would pop out. Trained as an aerospace engineer and theoretical physicist at MIT and Stanford, Holdren taught for decades at Berkeley and Harvard, while also serving on a huge array of public policy-related committees and commissions. He served as a member of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology under President Clinton, and even gave the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech on behalf of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (which won for work on nuclear disarmament). In 2009, President Obama tapped him to be his science advisor, and to run the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) at the White House.

Truman, of course, did not have long left in office to make that prophecy come true. But over the next seven decades, the prediction that a science advisor to the president could work only so well as the president allowed — and only as the big issues facing the country would dictate — would prove far more accurate than the position’s progenitors could have imagined.

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