When I asked John Holdren what it really means to “have the president’s ear” in this role, he seemed a bit agitated by t

“So, you have a situation — “ He stopped, pondering. “There have been a lot of science advisors who have been more influential than they got credit for.” He told me that early in his career, he had been mentored by some of the first presidential advisors, including George Kistiakowsky (Eisenhower) and Jerry Wiesner (Kennedy). “They all told me, you get more done if you don’t care who gets the credit.”

One could argue that this is just the whining of a special interest group, and that all such groups think they deserve a greater say than every other such group. Or perhaps there is a kernel of truth in the whining, and even at the best of times science’s place at the table has been a bit farther away from the head than it should be, and occasionally all the way off at the kids’ table instead.

In the aftermath of Nixon’s dismantling of the White House science apparatus, discussions soon began regarding how exactly to resurrect it. Gerald Ford eventually appointed H. Guyford Stever, former president of Carnegie Mellon University and director of the National Science Foundation, as his science advisor, reestablishing the post, while Congress chipped in with the National Science and Technology Policy and Organization Act of 1976, establishing the Office of Science and Technology Policy inside the office of the president. In some ways, though, the former influence seen by Killian, Kistiakowsky and Wiesner was gone.

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The concept had several iterations, but in general it called for the use of nuclear-powered space-based lasers and mirrors (again: sound familiar?) that would shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles fired from the Soviet Union. Keyworth became known as “one of the Administration’s most ardent proselytizers for the proposal.” He called research into the concept “an absolutely vital catalyst to real arms control.”

A few months later, Frank Press gathered more than 100 prominent colleagues to Washington to argue against budget cuts that would dramatically impact scientific research (a familiar theme, again). Keyworth pooh-poohed the angst, saying that “science in the United States is healthy today.” In Keyworth’s view, apparently, an 11 percent drop across the board in support for science was healthy. He accused the scientists of “lacking in realism.” This refrain, and others where scientific concerns were shunned in favor of political expediency, would come up again and again during his tenure: in February 1983 he defended the administration’s heavy tilt toward defense-related science funding; in June of that year, amidst further complaints about a lack of federal support, Keyworth blamed the scientists for “pork barrel squabble[s]”; Keyworth called an early report on global warming “unwarranted and unnecessarily alarmist” (sound familiar?); and so on. He even refused to comment on whether the Pentagon had spent money researching “psychic” weaponry, helpfully putting up a wall between the public and the Administration’s least scientific uses of money.

Of course, that’s only true, again, when the president doesn’t care about scientific progress over political expedience. Our sample size is limited, but unfortunately, that order of priorities has dominated more often than one would hope.

Seen from another viewpoint, though, the scientific community seems to have always felt that their needs were not being well represented at the White House. In the journal Science just after Ronald Reagan was elected, an advisor to the President-Elect was said to think that “the role of science adviser was narrowed and weakened in the Carter White House.” George H.W. Bush promised to elevate the position after it had been sublimated under Reagan. President Obama promised to “restore science to its rightful place.” Even as far back as 1954, when the advisor was part-time and headed up a committee to help the president, William Golden wrote to a colleague that the science advisory mechanisms “had not fulfilled the hopes” that the community had for it.

The advisor who is willing, in Holdren’s words, to go on “beavering away in the trenches just getting stuff done,” will have more success than one who needs to be seen and heard as well. Seems reasonable, until we rephrase: furthering scientific progress can only be done effectively at the White House when it is done in the shadows.

Ronald Reagan’s first advisor, George A. Keyworth, II, offers another example of this possibility. There had been fewer complaints regarding Stever under Ford, and Jimmy Carter’s advisor Frank Press claimed in a letter to Golden that he found his “access to the President as good as that of any previous Science Adviser and better than most” (of course, this was written on Executive Office of the President letterhead, so perhaps Press shouldn’t be expected to openly complain about his boss).

This Stars Wars evangelism ran in the face of scientific scorn. A report prepared in April 1984 for Congress concluded that the possibility of a functional nukes-and-lasers system “is so remote that it should not serve as the basis of public expectation or national policy about ballistic missile defense.” In general, one would hope that such a scathing conclusion — shared across much of the scientific community — would hold some sway over the president’s science advisor and thus over the president. It did not.

In the end, obviously, though billions of dollars were spent and years wasted, the U.S. does not have a series of lasers in space ready to shoot down incoming missiles. Though this battle continued long after Keyworth resigned in late 1985, he seems to have been somewhat beaten down by this, or other episodes. Earlier that year, he gave a scathing interview, accusing the press — which he said was “drawn from a relatively narrow fringe element on the far left” — of “trying to tear down America.”

Keyworth’s insistence on cheerleading over scientific advocacy represents another low point in the advisor’s history, though even he had his bright spots. Funding for science did improve some over his tenure, for which (if we can again break Neal Lane’s rule regarding blame or credit) he received some accolades. It makes the assessment of this role’s impact all the more difficult. In 1975, William Golden wrote to a colleague as President Ford undertook the work of rebuilding what Nixon had torn down: “A second-rate science adviser,” he wrote, “is likely to be worse than none at all. We shall see.”

Keyworth, who formerly headed up the physics division at Los Alamos National Laboratory, very quickly made clear that he came down firmly on the “cheerleader” side of our ever-present science advisor seesaw. In an interview in August 1981, he seemed to harken back to the early days when military matters dominated all thoughts of science: “The President has strong defense views and so do I. To have a dovish science adviser in this administration would not enhance his credibility.” The boss likes bombs, so I like bombs.

But the most glaring example of this Administration-before-science attitude by far was the Star Wars debacle. Formally known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, this slow-moving train wreck involved, yet again, a missile-defense system, and yet again, it was panned by scientists but championed by the White House. In the past, advisors like DuBridge had tried to walk a line on the issue, and at least weren’t seen shouting from the rooftops about it; Keyworth climbed the Washington Monument to stump for Star Wars.